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Here I believe one’s point of reference should not be to the great model of language (langue) 
and signs, but to that of war and battle. The history which bears and determines us has the 
form of a war rather than that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning. 
—Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power”1
For most people in the United States, war is almost always elsewhere. Since the Civil War, declared wars have been engaged on terrains at a distance from the continental space of the nation. Until the attacks on 
the World Trade towers and the Pentagon in September 2001, many people in 
the United States perceived war to be conflicts between the standing armies of 
nation-states conducted at least a border—if not oceans and continents—away. 
Even the attacks of September 11 were localized in such a way as to feel as 
remote as they were immediate—watching cable news from elsewhere in the 
country, most U.S. residents were brought close to scenes of destruction and 
death by the media rather than by direct experience. Thus, in the United 
States, we could be said to be “consumers” of war, since our gaze is almost 
always fixed on representations of war that come from places perceived to be 
remote from the heartland. 
Digital communications and transnational corporate practices are transform-
ing the modes, locations, and perceptions of nationalized identities as well as 
the operations of contemporary warfare. Certainly, war is consumed worldwide 
by global, as well as national, audiences. Indeed, if the conflicts of the present 
age cannot be described as between nation-states but as between the extra- or 
transnational symbols of political, religious, and cultural philosophies or ide-
ologies, drawing on national identity becomes a more challenging task. Yet, 
conditions specific to the United States need to be explored in relation to the 
network of discourses, subjects, and practices that make up our nation and its 
government. The United States still signifies a coherent identity, if only as the 
enemy or perpetrator of attacks against people outside its national borders or 
as the defender of borders that are perceived by many of its residents as too 
porous and insecure. Situating the cultural, political, and economic workings 
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of the United States within transnational conditions aids our understanding 
of the ways in which national identity operates as a powerful enhancement to 
contemporary globalization. The issue is not the difference between national 
and international subjects of study but the mystification of the national such 
that its identifications with global capital disappear from view, leaving behind 
patriotic articulations of security, prosperity, and freedom.
When U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower and his speechwriter Malcolm 
Moos coined the term “military-industrial complex” in 1961, they described 
a moment poised between the aftermath of the world wars and the advent 
of the conflicts to come in which the U.S.-based armaments industries could 
combine their influence with those in the military and the government, who 
would come to gain from such an alliance. Eisenhower argued that this kind 
of war corporatism could tip the hallowed liberal balance between defense and 
social programs, leading to a war economy without end. Over the last forty 
years, the hybrid form of governmentality that Eisenhower delineated in his 
speech materialized as Congress, industry, and the military created a culture of 
cooperation that overcame any internal tensions to produce a normalization 
of what could be construed as conflict of interest, or even cronyism. As the 
work of James Der Derian, Tim Lenoir, Jennifer Terry, and others demonstrates 
so powerfully, for people in the United States war is not at all elsewhere but 
is, in fact, deeply imbricated in everyday life as a “military-industrial-media-
entertainment network.”2
Who becomes a militarized subject through this network in the United 
States today? Two primary ways in which militarization operates in U.S. con-
temporary culture are the pervasive use of Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS), the primary model of data collection, sorting, and storage in use for 
over thirty years, and the practice of so-called target marketing, a geographi-
cally based form of classifying neighborhoods through subsets of demographic 
information. The same year that Eisenhower critiqued the military-industrial 
complex, scientist Jonathan Robbin founded General Analytics Corporation 
(GAC—the forerunner of Claritas, Inc.) to explore the industry potential of 
a new science—geodemography, the use of the computer to identify and map 
subsets of the U.S. population by zip code and neighborhood. Throughout 
the 1960s and into the 1970s, GAC/Claritas linked geography to demography 
by drawing on the statistics and classification system used in the biological 
sciences to categorize plants and animals by species and by fine-tuning the 
zoning capacities of U.S. Postal Service zip codes. By the 1970s, Claritas was 
applying multivariate regression analysis to census and marketing survey data 
and “target marketing” could be said to be in full swing.3 
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Geodemography and target marketing could come about, however, only 
as an outgrowth of GIS. The power of GIS lies in its ability to link informa-
tion and inquiries of various kinds to location. The flexibility of its analytical 
capacities can be attributed to the ways in which the system combines layers 
of information, including visual material, to answer complex questions in in-
creasingly precise registers. As John Pickles has argued, GIS “contributes to a 
(re)placing of the ‘visual’ and the ‘spatial’ at the center of social life through its 
role as an element in the restructuring of global, regional, and local geographies, 
the assertion of new disciplinary codes and practices, and the constitution of 
new images of earth and society.”4 It is difficult to imagine the Web-based 
Internet with all of its graphic interfaces without the cultural shift engendered 
by GIS. Indeed, it could be said that the centrality of geographical images in 
information sciences helped to create the visual logics of contemporary U.S. 
subjectivity.
The development of GIS exemplifies the era of the military-industrial 
complex. Its emergence required computer research, geo-mapping, photogra-
phy, and satellite programs—a process that involved academic, government, 
military, and commercial participation. The science behind GIS is not limited 
by nationality. Most histories point to the development of “Canadian GIS” 
(CGIS) in 1967, the system invented by that country’s Department of Energy, 
Mines, and Resources to inventory land use and geographical information, as 
the first fully realized “system.”5 The power and resources of the transnational 
technoscience that the United States and the U.S.S.R. “raced” to secure were 
fully available to the U.S. military and research universities during the cold 
war. As the United States rushed to militarize space and extend the range of 
weapons that could be used for deterrence or for waging attacks on compet-
ing superpowers, computer science and satellite programs burgeoned. The 
geographic identification, sorting, and surveillance offered by GIS produced 
new commercial, military, academic, and governmental needs. Combined 
with the remote sensing capacities of new satellite systems that could generate 
continuous images of the earth’s surface, GIS provided an affirmation of the 
“whole earth” ethos that was coming to characterize the cultural zeitgeist in 
the United States during the 1960s and 1970s while offering fresh possibilities 
for security and surveillance as the cold war alliances shifted and reconfigured 
under the pressures of new conditions and crises.6
I am particularly interested in the temporal and discursive overlap of these 
two technologies, GIS and geodemography, with a third: the global positioning 
system (GPS). All three emerge in the postcolonial era of globalization with 
all of its attendant tensions and negotiations between national and transna-
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tional culture. GPS originated as a military technology—a system of satel-
lites launched by the U.S. Department of Defense in the early 1970s7—that 
offered precise ground locations for both defensive and offensive purposes.8 
The offensive purposes most famously enabled by GPS were the navigation 
of the weapons systems during the first Persian Gulf war in 1990–91. Since 
that time, and in connection with a complicated process of partial declassifica-
tion and cooperative ventures between civilian, governmental, military, and 
commercial interests, GPS has become a ubiquitous consumer technology 
available in cars, watches, and PDAs. GPS has become integrated into the 
agriculture and transportation industries, law enforcement, and innumerable 
other commercial, municipal, and federal applications (it crops up regularly 
in discussions of border security).
In this article, I am inquiring into the conditions that produce U.S. 
militarized consumer and citizen subjects in relation to technologies that link 
geography, demography, remote sensing, and contemporary identity politics 
(including geopolitics). These subjects can be understood to be the “targets” of 
two seemingly distinct contexts and practices: the target of a weapon and the 
target of a marketing campaign.9 In both cases, something or somebody has 
to be identified, coordinates have to be determined with available technolo-
gies, and the target has to be clearly marked or recognized in time and space. 
GIS provides the model for databases as well as the representational logic for 
both warfare and marketing, while GPS offers enhanced precision in locat-
ing such targets through accurate positioning. Geographically based location 
technologies that draw on discourses of precision make possible the subjects 
of both consumption and war. 
“Where Am I? Ask a Satellite”10 
The technology is already here. Drivers using the Global Positioning System (GPS) have 
an option to jump in their cars, plug in area maps, and know exactly where they are. Pilots, 
charting their own courses, can savor free flight, saving time and fuel as they go, and sailors 
can navigate harbors in high-tech mode. Up-to-date hikers are already augmenting the 
compasses in their gear with transistor-size GPS receivers, and truck drivers are both tracking 
and being tracked. It will not be long before universal GPS coordinates serve as postal zip 
codes. Business cards will list not only telephone and fax numbers and e-mail addresses but 
will give precise latitude and longitude coordinates for our home and business addresses.
—L. Casey Larijani, GPS for Everyone11
Commercial and civilian GPS publications tend to characterize GPS as an 
advance in human society on the order of the discovery of fire or the antibacte-
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rial properties of soap. An introductory GPS textbook from 1996 tells us that 
GPS is the “ultimate achievement of humankind’s urge to know where [one 
is], at extraordinarily high levels of precision.”12 At the heart of this overheated 
assertion is the belief that human beings are urgently concerned with where 
they are and where they are going. Most important, technological assistance in 
the direction and interpretation of these processes is required. From “the clay 
tablets of the Mesopotamians some 5,000 years ago” to the GPS-enhanced 
watch or cell phone of the corporate executive in contemporary U.S. society, 
the truism of the desire to know where you are is presented as absolute and 
unquestioned.13 Regardless of political perspective, U.S. discourse on GPS 
throughout the 1990s and into the next century assumes that “maps hold 
some primal attraction to the human animal.”14 The “lure” of maps, presented 
as timeless and cross-cultural, is presented as a foundational attitude of civil 
society—access to mapping (especially technologically enhanced mapping) 
is a hallmark of democracy. From the end of the first Persian Gulf war and 
throughout the 1990s, as GPS increasingly became part of the popular imagi-
nary of location and navigation in the United States, enthusiastic endorsements 
of “GPS for Everyone” offered precise positioning for the masses.15 As a 1994 
article in the Wall Street Journal put it, GPS is “An Answer to the Age-Old 
Cry: Where on Earth Am I?”16 A piece in Rolling Stone in 1992 trumpeted, 
“Lost in America—Not!”17
The proliferation of ads, press releases, and media spots (such as coverage 
in tabloid TV and print media on celebrity use of GPS) throughout the 1990s 
and into the next century focused on location—where you are—but linked 
closely to that designation was almost always something existential: where 
you are reveals who you are. For example, a 1995 article on in-car navigation 
systems in Popular Science boasted: “Real Men Don’t Ask Directions.”18 A 
software review in 1993 advised: “Find Yourself with GPS MapKit SV.”19 For 
North Americans, the marketing of this novel technology emphasized personal 
empowerment and self-knowledge linked to speed and precision (save time, 
increase efficiency, avoid getting lost). Buried in the promotional hype of the 
emerging technology was the kind of conventional paradox of hegemony with 
which middle-class consumers of digital electronics are now quite familiar in 
the new millennium: the digitalization of information about yourself that you 
provide voluntarily to enhance your “lifestyle” also brings you into networks of 
surveillance. Who you are, geographically, is a target—of marketers, govern-
ments, identity thieves, hackers, and so on.20 
When civilians use commercial digitalized navigational assistance based 
on GPS, then, they are participating in the expansion of mapping into more 
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extreme relational contexts, which has the effect of intensifying unequal social 
relations. The digital mingling of position and identity into target subjects 
underscores the martial and territorial aspect of mapping throughout the 
modern period. Maps are always subjective representations; their parameters 
and spatialized views reflect the needs and interests of those who intend to 
use them. While the history of maps stretches back into the earliest recorded 
representations, the rise of print culture, the spread of capitalism, and the desire 
to chart the mobile circulations of modern culture created a specific practice 
of mapping.21 New nation-states required maps of redrawn borders. Maps 
became indispensable to track armies in war. By the turn of the nineteenth 
century, the convergence of aerial perspectives made possible by aviation and 
the relatively new technology and art of photography intensified the visual 
logic of mapping to the degree that it became possible, and even an advantage, 
to conduct war from the air.22 Thus, the legacy of geography, war, and aerial 
perspective are writ large in GPS. When people turn to satellites to tell them 
where they are, they mobilize these histories. At the same time, these tech-
nologies of location situate consumers within the mythologies of individual 
empowerment and precision that advertisers employ to market the idea that 
one must always be locatable.
The Ultimate Achievement: The Myth of Precision
In order to release a bomb so that it will hit the target, the exact point in space must be 
determined.
—Albert L. Pardini, The Legendary Norden Bombsight23
Like many technologies in use in daily life, GPS was created as a result of 
military research and development. While its commercial and industrial ap-
plications bear little resemblance to practices of war, the ways in which GPS 
operates in daily life are extremely similar to its original purpose, targeting 
through precise positioning.24 Yet precision is a relative concept. Oceans have 
been navigated with a sextant and the naked eye, but the destined port of 
harbor does not have to be observed within terms that we would think of as 
“precise” today. The imaginary properties of precision adjust to the means 
available to achieve them. Thus, the powerful association of GPS with preci-
sion marks a nexus point in discourses of modern technoscience, especially 
those linked to aviation and remote sensing. The quest to pinpoint precisely 
the object of sight, as when aiming a weapon, emerges as a collaborative goal 
for the military-industrial complex only if the right tools are available to meet 
the dominant cultural, economic, and political imperatives. 
| 699Precision Targets
GPS exemplifies the belief in precision as a required element in armaments, 
especially in bombardment, and the militarization of space. According to 
military historians, the entire rationale for GPS development was linked to 
the demands of precision in missile guidance. Standard histories point to the 
checkered experience of aerial bombing raids during the world wars and after 
to demonstrate the importance of accurate targeting, especially for bombard-
ments at night or in poor weather conditions. However, Donald MacKenzie 
argues that the desire for bombing precision is neither natural nor inevitable 
but the product of “a complex process of conflict and collaboration between a 
range of social actors including ambitious, energetic technologists, laboratories 
and corporations, and political and military leaders and the organizations they 
head.”25 MacKenzie’s research demonstrates that a technologically determinist 
discourse of accuracy or precision marks the attitudes of both the political Right 
and Left in debates about military technologies during the period between the 
two world wars. How precision came to dominate discourses of military strategy 
in the period before World War II through the Vietnam War and beyond to the 
first Persian Gulf war is a complicated tale of the competing claims on resources 
between the branches of the U.S. armed forces as well as the growing power of 
what should really be termed the governmental-military-industrial complex.26 
Above all, the mystique of precision became the underlying rationale for the 
founding of an air force separate from the navy (which had its own flight 
craft and pilots) and for the organizing of U.S. national defense and offensive 
warfare on the principles of airpower. 
The rise of airpower as a military strategy is linked to the belief, passionately 
argued in the aftermath of WWI’s previously unimaginable number of civilian 
as well as military casualties, that precision bombing would be a more humane 
practice than previous strategies of ground wars. Intrinsic to the argument for 
aerial bombardment are the key European Enlightenment precepts of distance, 
precision, and the truth-value of sight. Each of these concepts itself requires an 
underlying belief in the mastery of technology and the superiority of informa-
tion systems that privilege vision. Nothing brought these disparate discourses 
and ideologies together more effectively than the development of enhanced 
bombsights in WWII. The ability to target selected sites on the ground from 
a machine traveling at rapid speeds through uncertain weather at heights great 
enough to remain safe from enemy detection and attack was not easy to achieve. 
The U.S. military itself was divided on the subject of airpower and the necessity 
of a separate air force branch.27 Moreover, given the technological constraints, 
it was not clear that the moral high ground that precision bombing seemed to 
offer was achievable. Navigational and computational errors, inaccurate intel-
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ligence, weather interference, and human and technological failures often sent 
bombs awry, killing innocent civilians while destroying nonmilitary sites and 
structures. Nevertheless, the impression prevailed that U.S. precision bomb-
ing was far superior to its obverse strategy: tactical or saturation bombing, a 
technique that focused on destroying the morale of the civilian population in 
enemy territory through wide-scale devastation and terror.28 
Aerial bombardment during WWI had consisted of dropping armaments 
by hand with “no bombing sights, no aiming points, and no true bombs.”29As 
the world geared up for the next war, entire industries were pressed into the 
quest for high-tech solutions to the perceived need for precision—both to 
better the record of aerial bombardment and to protect the lives of the air-
men. With the new bombsights developed for WWII, popular belief held 
that a bombardier’s precision was increased such that he could “drop a bomb 
into a pickle barrel.”30 While this claim to precision was often contradicted 
by evidence, the bombardier became a heroic, even iconic, figure in popular 
perception.31 As Conrad Crane argues, accurate daylight bombing, with its 
precision mystique, called upon “traditional,” favored American characteristics 
such as marksmanship, fair play, and other “frontier” stereotypes, adding to 
its strategic appeal to planners and the public alike.32 The precise aim of the 
bombardier (in truth, more the result of skilled mathematical calculation and 
new technologies than the classic “line of sight” attributed to great marksmen) 
became legendary. The development of the Norden and Sperry bombsights, 
along with the engineering of the B-17 long-range airplane (known as the 
“Flying Fortress”), brought daylight precision bombing into the policy and 
strategy of modern warfare as an integral component of airpower.
The bombsights developed for use in WWII were designed to address the 
problem of hitting a stationary target from a moving vehicle, the airplane. As 
Albert L. Pardini, one of the most devoted chroniclers of the Norden bomb-
sight, explained the process, “a falling bomb, in order to hit the target, must be 
released at the correct distance back from the target so that it will not fall short 
or over.”33 Factors such as gravity, true airspeed, air resistance, and wind had to 
be accounted for as well. Since the Norden bombsight used gyroscopes to hold 
the optical system in place during the movements of the plane through the 
air, it was viewed as a huge advance over the aerial surveillance and bombard-
ment used in WWI. The Norden bombsight and its counterparts transformed 
problems of time and space into principles of geometry—offering the latest 
science and technology to the bombardier, who was responsible not only for 
delivering the payload of armaments as accurately as possible but for getting 
the entire crew back safely by reducing costly repetitions and extra runs. It 
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was highly valued by the air crews who used it and became the subject of its 
own mythologized reputation (complete with fan clubs, exhibitions, Web 
sites, etc.).34 
The use of the Norden bombsight during WWII has been trumpeted as 
the technology that made airpower possible. Yet, the United States developed 
a doctrine of airpower, based on precision and the capacity of long-range 
bombers to reach their targets, that was not, in fact, able to be sustained 
under actual conditions of war. As Crane relates, elements such as weather, 
inadequate training, defensive fire, and camouflage resulted in only 14 percent 
of the bombs dropped by the Eighth Air Force during the first half of 1943 
to hit within 1,000 feet of their targets (rather than the 90 percent advertised 
by the top brass at the beginning of the war).35 The predicted precision of 
bombing raids, as Murray points out, was based on “unrealistic” situations: “on 
bombing ranges in the south-western United States, in conditions of perfect 
visibility, with bombers dropping on an individual basis and with no hostile 
anti-aircraft or enemy fighters.”36 Thousands of U.S. and allied flight crews 
lost their lives in pursuit of daylight targets when they came under sustained 
defensive fire in the theater of war. 
Despite these significant problems in execution, the airpower mystique of 
precision presented a cleaner, neater image than the wholesale, destructive 
blasting of terror bombing or cannon bombardment. The airmen who died 
either were incinerated or decimated in the air on impact or in the ruins of their 
aircraft if they hit the ground—arguably less of a cumulative visual calamity 
than the thousands of corpses moldering in the trenches of World War I. If, as 
Sven Lindqvist argues, Europe and the United States had learned from their 
colonial experiences that terror was the best way to devastate morale and crush 
opposition, the emergence of the doctrine of airpower and precision bombing 
proved to be the only acceptable rationale for the kind of large-scale attacks 
necessitated by wars between industrial powers in the modern period.37 Thus, 
the doctrine of precision, while pervasive, could not overlay completely the fact 
that morale or terror bombing was an accepted practice of the U.S. military and 
its allies. The firebombings of Dresden and Tokyo, therefore, were but dress 
rehearsals for the decision to drop atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. 
While the use of the atomic bomb appeared to shift the logic from precision 
to mass, total terror and destruction, it is with the development of GIS and 
satellite-guided missile systems that characterize later wars that airpower and 
the mystique of precision return with a vengeance. 
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The Precision of “Space Power” and the First Persian Gulf War
One of the major advantages that planners like Schwarzkopf possessed was excellent intel-
ligence assets. The environment of the desert campaign lent itself to the acquisition of 
accurate information about the enemy. In space, reconnaissance satellites like the KH-11 
and the lacrosse radar-imaging satellite provided untouchable (by Iraqi forces) coverage of 
the battlespace. Other satellites carried the critical communication channels and equally 
important were those satellites that allowed the global positioning system (GPS) to work. 
GPS allowed unprecedented levels of accuracy concerning battlefield navigation that was 
so vital in maneuver warfare. 
—Alastair Finlan, The Gulf War 199138
Precision returns as a popular discourse in military-industrial society when 
positioning technologies made possible by the satellite systems that were 
launched in the 1970s and ’80s offered new standards of accuracy.39 Most 
histories of the Persian Gulf War make the point that this was the first war to 
make extensive use of satellite technology. Not even fully operational when 
the war began in 1990, GPS quickly took pride of place in the pantheon of 
satellite-assisted technologies that the U.S. military and its allies used in the 
conflict. Combining multispectral imagery from US LANDSAT remote sens-
ing and GPS, commanders had access to detailed maps that could be updated 
quickly and accurately. Approximately 4,500 GPS receivers were used in the 
war, winning over troops on the ground and pilots in the air.40 Shifting the 
scale of airpower to “space power,” GPS and other satellite systems aided both 
air and ground forces, enhancing conventional aerial surveillance to offer a 
network of image-based mapping and navigation.
The twenty-four NAVSTAR GPS satellites and their military and govern-
mental counterparts were not the only orbital technologies that affected the 
perception and outcome of the war. The conflict in the Persian Gulf in the 
early 1990s has been characterized as the first televisual war (in contrast to the 
film-based information broadcast during the war in Vietnam).41 The speed, 
immediacy, and accuracy of the real-time images broadcast by twenty-four-hour 
cable news services such as CNN depended on satellite telecommunications 
to an unprecedented degree. If during WWII newsreels reached movie theater 
audiences no less than a month after the occurrence of events depicted, that 
time lag had been reduced to approximately twenty-four to forty-eight hours 
between filming on-site and broadcast by TV during the Vietnam war.42 During 
the first Persian Gulf war, the seemingly real-time television coverage of Patriot 
missiles and Scud attacks generated what Robert Stam has called the “pleasures 
of war spectatorship”;43 CNN’s five telecommunications satellites fed simulated 
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“live” accounts twenty-four hours a day, offering greater identification with 
the military apparatus for many of the viewers glued to their sets during the 
relatively short-lived conflict.
The truth effect of digital immediacy and the mystique of satellite-aided 
precision presented a view of the war that built upon the realist documentary 
tradition.44 Although most of the visual material that was transmitted was heav-
ily censored by the Pentagon, it was presented as live and unmediated. Many 
commentators point to the contrast between the Vietnam War, where reporters 
were able to roam mostly at will (which brought the complexity and atrocities 
of the conflict into the living rooms of the general U.S. public via TV), and the 
managed “pool” approach mandated by the Pentagon during the first Persian 
Gulf war (establishing the approach for succeeding wars). The media image of 
the conflict in the Gulf, as Stig Nohrstedt explains, was “ruled by restrictions on 
journalists’ freedom to visit front areas, troops, damaged buildings, and so on 
without military escorts.”45 Reporters, desperate for footage and for any kind 
of story line, relied on whatever technology could provide. Thus, the “you are 
there” effect of reporters describing tracer fire from their Baghdad hotel room 
windows was reinforced by the seeming speed of the transmissions. As many 
commentators have argued over the years since the war, the media, in general, 
played technological handmaiden to the U.S. military in its effort to manage 
the representation of the conflict. As Douglas Kellner relates in his history of 
the television coverage of the war, “the initial strategy of the war managers was 
to present an image of the war that was clean, precise, and effective.”46 Since 
the military was engaged in a public relations campaign as well as a military 
engagement, the mystique of precision bombing helped to allay concerns about 
civilian casualties and damage to nonmilitary and religiously significant sites.47 
The airpower doctrine of precision bombing, here aided by GPS and other 
GIS-related mapping technologies, combined with the seemingly instantaneous 
media coverage that was enabled by telecommunications satellites to reassure 
the U.S. population that the heroic project of saving Kuwait from Iraqi invad-
ers was not going to be messy, wasteful in terms of lives and money, or boring. 
Thus, in the early 1990s, the governmental-industrial-military-complex linked 
once and for all with the media-entertainment complex—forming new subjects 
of a militarized visual culture.48
If the Norden bombsight captured the imagination of the military and 
public alike during WWII to assuage concerns about the morality of bombing, 
engendering discourses of precision and aerial mastery, GPS played a signifi-
cant role in the public relations war as it was spun in the “military-industrial-
media-entertainment network” of the Persian Gulf war. As Daniel Hallin has 
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put it, “overwhelmingly the dominant images of Persian Gulf coverage were 
the images of triumphant technology.”49 Since the media were barred from 
battlefield coverage, they resorted to iconographic images that played to the 
nationalist sentiments of TV watchers at home and kept them tuning in: “the 
Patriot streaking up to hit a Scud in the night sky; the cruise missiles arching 
gracefully toward their targets; the jet fighters landing at sunrise or sunset (a 
favorite TV visual) with soldiers watching and giving the thumbs-up sign; and 
most characteristically, the smart bomb video.”50 
The visual elements of the “smart” weapons entranced many Persian Gulf 
war spectators. An editorial published in the Nation during the war in Febru-
ary 1991 relates the example of liberal viewers who enthused, “we hate the 
war . . . but we are into the planes.”51 Or, as reporter Fred Kaplan recalled in 
the late 1990s, “seven years have passed since the last time the United States 
bombed Iraq, but one gripping image lingers—video footage shot on Jan. 17, 
1991, the first night of the air war, of a laser-guided bomb plunking straight 
down the chimney of an Iraqi Air Force building and blowing the place off 
the map.”52 These “gripping” images were produced by video cameras in the 
“smart” bombs that were designed to record the strike. In the absence of other 
visual records, the “smart bomb” footage took on a privileged percentage of the 
display of technological prowess for which the war is known. The “objective 
eye” of the smart bomb linked the values of realism, action, and precision that 
many spectators came to regard as a guilty or not-so-guilty pleasure—watching 
the U.S. blow stuff to bits in an urban or desert landscape that appeared to 
be devoid of human beings. The explosions were represented as precise strikes 
“through windows” or “down chimneys” of selected targets. Thus, the guiltless 
pleasure of viewership was as much due to the belief in the power of precision 
and the thrill of knowing that the armaments were moving through space and 
time at enormous speeds to strike a target with exceptional accuracy.
The overwhelming impression conveyed by the military-industrial-me-
dia-entertainment network was that the United States and its allies were 
undertaking precision attacks on military targets, thereby conducting war on 
a higher moral plane and avoiding unnecessary “collateral damage” and, not 
incidentally, offering good visual entertainment.53 However, as numerous com-
mentators have pointed out in the years since the war, although most of the 
bombs dropped in Iraq (approximately 90 percent) were regular “gravity” or 
“dumb” bombs without laser or satellite guidance and while a high percentage 
of those bombs missed their targets (some estimates go as high as 70 percent), 
what most Americans probably remember about the war is the discourse of 
precision linked to the imagery produced by the so-called smart bombs. Yet, 
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the precision-guided bombs were also likely to miss their marks. Weather, hu-
man error, poor intelligence, and any number of other problems plagued the 
laser- and GPS-guided missiles and bombs. And, despite the hype, more of 
the “smart” weapons in the first Gulf war were guided by laser systems than by 
GPS (which has gained proportionate majority in precision-guided weapons 
programs in subsequent wars). Significantly, the well-documented imprecision 
of the bombing campaign just never gained any traction, since the evidence 
runs so counter to the discourse of precision and technological mastery that 
dominated the airwaves during the conflict itself. The most notorious mishap 
occurred on February 13, 1991, when, based on intelligence identifying the site 
as a military hard target, a guided missile hit the Ameriya civil-defense shelter 
at 4:30 a.m., killing between 200 and 300 civilians. In a 402-page published 
report, Middle East Watch chronicled “needless deaths” during the war due 
to innumerable violations of the official U.S. military and allied policies, such 
as daytime bomb and missile attacks on targets in populated areas, lack of 
warning, strafing attacks on civilian vehicles on highways, attacks on Bedouin 
tents, and so on. The report concluded that approximately 3,000 civilian 
Iraqis died from direct attacks, while a “substantially larger” number died or 
suffered greatly from malnutrition, disease, and lack of medical care caused 
by “a combination of the U.N.-mandated embargo and the allies’ destruction 
of Iraq’s electrical system.”54
“Space power” and the vast resources of the military-industrial-media-enter-
tainment network generated discourses of precision that obscured information 
about civilian deaths or rendered them inconsequential. The representation of 
the war was less embodied than previous representations of wars, with U.S. 
military casualties going undercover or under the radar, as it were, as well. If 
the “witnessing” of the war came from the missiles themselves, the point of 
view was singular, unidirectional, and heavily censored in favor of orchestrated 
displays of precision. Thus, much of what took place on the ground during the 
war was never a matter of public record in the globalized televisual experience 
of the “real.” In effect, in the coverage of the Persian Gulf war the U.S. public 
watched an extended commercial for GPS.
Aftermath: Target Subjects of the Military-Industrial-Media-
Entertainment Network
While classical liberal political theory has understood social rights as opposed to market 
relations, by the late twentieth century and the early twenty-first consumer culture had 
become central to liberalism and neoliberalism, promoting endlessly the idea of choice 
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as central to a liberated subject and enabling the hegemony of both capitalist democracy, 
American style, and the self-actualizing and identity-producing possibilities of consump-
tion, American style. 
—Inderpal Grewal, Transnational America55
The first Persian Gulf war was not anomalous. If it was the first war to be 
“driven” by satellite technologies, the logics of those weapons and communica-
tions systems built on the practices and problem-solving techniques of previous 
wars. The amplified opportunities for research, development, and profit making 
that marked the emergence of the military-industrial complex in the 1960s 
and its expanded transnational formation, the “military-industrial-media-en-
tertainment network” at the close of the twentieth century, provided fertile 
ground for the discursive fields of “technoscience,” that “world-building” set 
of alliances that Donna Haraway has identified as “military needs, academic 
research, commercial development, democracy, access to knowledge, standard-
ization, globalization, and wealth.”56 At the turn of the century, technoscience 
and its networks produce target subjects through discourses of precise scales 
and sites of identity. Yet even as these modes of identification promise greater 
flexibility and pleasure through the proliferation of “choices” among myriad 
specificities, they also militarize and thus habituate citizen/consumers to a 
continual state of war understood as virtual engagement. As Jordan Crandall 
argues, operational media such as GPS-enhanced devices and their ancillary 
discourses aim to “increase productivity, agility and awareness, yet they vastly 
increase the tracking capabilities of marketing and management regimes,” 
thereby facilitating the integration of military, corporate, and leisure interests.57 
Lured by “individually tailored enticements,” the subjects of technoscience, 
dedicated to “choice” and to “democracy” as the twin bulwarks of the U.S. 
“lifestyle,” become targets of the information systems they use to satisfy their 
desires. As Crandall writes, “tracked, the user becomes a target within the 
operational interfaces of the marketing worlds, into whose technologies state 
surveillance is outsourced.”58 
Most people who search for driving directions on Web sites or who check 
out “Google Earth” and other services that offer free satellite photography of 
specific locations are largely unaware of the military infrastructure that sup-
ports such activities. Similarly, most people are not aware of their identification 
for target marketing through computer databases linked to the use of credit 
cards, supermarket cards, and driver’s licenses. GIS is not a subject of informed 
discussion among most consumers in the United States even if they may be 
able to debate the virtues of a GPS-enabled automobile when faced with a 
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choice of rental cars. Thus, as DeLanda and other theorists of militarization 
have pointed out, the ways in which military institutions, resources, and 
discourses structure facets of nonmilitary life are mystified in the energetic 
“forgetting” of the military sources of technologies that many people enjoy or 
feel required to use in everyday life. Yet, a deterministic approach to military 
“R&D” can oversimplify the ways in which technoscience and its networks, 
including media and entertainment, produce hegemonic consent among the 
citizen/consumers of the present age.
Tim Lenoir has argued that changes in government procurement policies 
have prompted the military to “spin off ” many of their key technologies dur-
ing the last fifteen to twenty years.59 The case of GPS is more complicated, 
since it has been the property of the nonmilitary branches of the government 
through the Department of Transportation since the mid-1980s. Its partially 
declassified nature and unusually “open” practices while it was still under 
development made it particularly suitable for commercial “attention.” By the 
early to mid-1990s, GPS had become ubiquitous in the United States, and its 
counterparts had become part of the orbital culture of other nations as well. 
The home page for “GPS World” (a typical site that promotes the technology) 
currently lists the following industry sectors as relevant to the technology: 
survey and construction, military and government, avionics and transporta-
tion, location-based services, agricultural and natural resources, utilities and 
communications, and systems design and testing.60 GPS is used in numerous 
leisure time pursuits from hunting to yachting, and it has even generated its 
own sports, such as geocaching (a game that utilizes GIS and GPS to hide 
“treasure” and log information) and “degree confluence” (a game in which 
participants compete to “visit” every latitude and longitude “integer degree 
intersection” in the world). GPS navigational aides can be found in watches, 
PDAs, phones, and other hand-held units as well as in most forms of trans-
portation, both private and civil. In many ways, GPS has become a powerful 
metaphor and signifier for consumer culture at the turn of the century.61 And, 
of course, it is only more integrated into the warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq as 
another round of “democratization” is pursued by means of war in the Middle 
East and South Asia.62 
If contemporary subjects of technoscience and its military-industrial-me-
dia-entertainment networks are constituted as targets, it is imperative that 
we understand this as a form of mobilization. Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose 
have argued that the subject of consumption is “mobilized” through the links 
between “human passions, hopes, and anxieties” and the “specific features 
of goods.”63 I have tried to show how “precision” has entered the emotional 
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field of subjectivity as the military-industrial complex has grown to encom-
pass more fully the culture industries of media and entertainment. Thinking 
of consumer subjects as “mobilized” helps us in two regards. First, it allows 
us to move beyond the model of consumers as feminized, passive targets of 
unscrupulous advertisers in order to see the ways in which people participate 
in their construction by “volunteering,” if you will, to engage in the products 
generated by technoscience. Secondly, it allows us to understand how citizens 
and consumers come together as militarized subjects through target market-
ing that seeks to identify their tastes, desires, and interests. The ambiguity of 
subject formation generates the complexities of political and cultural life in 
an affluent nation. Regardless of whether or not we serve in the military or 
have the means to afford the latest electronics, residents of the United States 
are mobilized into militarized ways of being.
The aftermath of the first Persian Gulf war, then, has witnessed not only 
another war in the same region but also a proliferation of GPS-enhanced 
consumer goods and civilian applications of the technology. This period has 
also seen a veritable explosion of data-mining and marketing based on geode-
mographics.64 Most recently, the method of identifying consumers by zip code 
has been challenged by more multileveled cross-referencing. For example, the 
“old” ACORN Market Segmentation System divided the country into more 
than 250,000 blocks of neighborhoods. Each block was analyzed and sorted by 
some forty-nine characteristics, including household income, occupation, age, 
education, age of the housing stock, and other characteristics of neighborhood 
purchasing power. Blocks were then recombined under forty-four market seg-
ments including, for example, “trendsetting, suburban neighborhoods,” “older, 
depressed rural towns,” and “Hispanic and multi-racial neighborhoods.”65 
Throughout the 1990s there was mounting evidence of the growing importance 
of targeting consumers on the basis of “demography and habits rather than 
on the basis of geographical proximity”; as the maxim from 1980s advertising 
giant Saatchi & Saatchi had it, there are greater differences between midtown 
Manhattan and the Bronx than between midtown Manhattan and the seventh 
arrondissement in Paris.66
At the turn of the century, then, it is possible to propose that the citi-
zen/consumer subject in the United States is not so much identifiable in 
relation to intrinsic territories but mobilized as clusters of identities in and 
through consumption in the context of militarization.67 Militarization in the 
expanded sense in which I have been using it in this essay can be seen as a set 
of practices at work in sites of war, as well as those of consuming, schooling, 
worship, and homemaking. Yet, the deterritorializing tendencies of contem-
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porary geodemographics are tempered by the will to locate that subjects of 
consumption generate and require for identification. GIS- and GPS-linked 
technologies offer to tell citizen/consumers their precise location, positioning 
them geographically for any number of reasons. This recourse to terra firma 
can be seen as a recuperation of geography in the face of digitalized dispersal, 
but it can also be seen as an articulation of the world that GIS has wrought. 
The deep meaning of database culture in the age of the Internet is that the 
less we appear to need geographical information, the more it becomes clear 
how anchored contemporary power is to geography. That is, the anxiety over 
security, the call to militarize the borders of the nation, to further police the 
ports, to conduct satellite surveillance on individuals in their homes and places 
of work, shows us that the military-industrial-media-entertainment network 
reworks what geography means in terms of the nation-state under the sign of 
globalization and in the service of mobilization.
The ways in which the United States conducted war in the Persian Gulf in 
the early 1990s were made possible by the ways in which many U.S. residents 
became consumer and citizen subjects—through technoscience and its mul-
tiple, national, and transnational networks. Since that time, because power is 
scattered, unequal, and pervasive, war has become dispersed into many ways 
of being in the United States.68 Aiming for precision may be a symptom of 
that militarized dispersal of power, as fixity of location or identity resists the 
fluid dissolutions that are claimed to be a by-product of postmodernity. The 
marketing of location and navigation consumer goods both relies upon and 
generates discourses and practices of precision. In a time when nationalized 
empire employs the networks of technoscience and globalization to wage war on 
cultural, economic, and political fronts, it is necessary to analyze these circuits 
of power as serving nationalist interests, because the war can be ended only 
when we recognize our attachments to its subject-making potential. 
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